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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 3 ,  1894, William Ewart Gladstone , leader of the Liberal 
party for twenty years and the possessor of a political life that 
stretched back to 1832 , resigned the office of Prime Minister because of 
his opposition to an expanded nava l program. With this resignation, an 
era ended in English politics. 
Into Gladstone's place as First Minister of Her Majesty's Government 
and effective leader of the crumbling Liberal party, stepped Archibald 
Phillip Primrose ,  the 5th Earl of Rosebery. Lord Rosebery had been 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Mr. Gladstone's last Government. 
He was a wealthy young aristocrat whose Liberal Imperialistic views on 
foreign policy were more similar to those of the Tory leader, Lord Salisbury, 
than those of Mr. Gladstone. 
When Lord Ros�bery became Prime Minister of Great Britain changes of 
great importance were occurring in European political circles. These 
changes had started before Lord Rosebery became Premier, and they 
continued during and after his term of office. 
On the European continent itself, the Emperor Wil liam II of Germany 
had dismissed , in March of 1890, the famous Chancellor , Prince Otto Von 
Bismarck. Into his place were put a group of minor diplomats who had 
neither the knowledge nor the ability to replace the older statesman. The 
Reinsurance Treaty , signed by Germany and Russia in June of 1887, and which 
had· pledge·d Russian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war , no 
2 
longer existed. Gone too were the Mediterranean Agreements between 
Austria , England , and Italy, which had arranged for the maintenance of 
the status quo in the Near East. These were serious events for Germany , 
for she had now lost the contact she had formerly had with England and 
Russia. l 
The other Great Power on the continent, France, was by the nature o f  
her expanding program of imperialism, coming to be a t  variance with 
England. Not only were relations becoming more and more strained , but 
war itself had nearly ensued between the two Powers in the sunnner o f  1893. 
The story of this crisis illustrates just one of the many instances when 
French and British interests were at odds. 
This crisis arose over Siam, an area long of interest to the British 
because it lay between the British possession o f  Burma and the Indo-Chinese 
possessions of France. When France declared war on Siam in 1893 over a 
border dispute, the British at once sent war ships to Bangkok. The 
French had declared an extremely stiff ultimatum to the Siamese government 
and blocked the coast. The British ships ,  along with other neutral 
vesse l s ,  were asked to leave the area. Lord Rosebery , then Secretary for 
Foreign Affair s ,  telegraphed the ships not to leave , and then notified 
the French of his action. At the same time, Lord Rosebery convinced the 
Siamese government to accept the French ultimatum i f  it were given in a 
modified form. Because of the strength of this move , the French 
modified their demand s ,  Siam then accepted them. and the British ships 
were recalled. 2 This cri s i s ,  however , gave rise to other territorial 
lRaymond Sontag, Germany and England, 1848-1894 (New York: Russell 
and Russell Inc. , 1964) , p.  298. 
2 G. P. Gooch· and J. W. Ward (eds. ) ,  The Cambridge History of British 
Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmi llan Co. , 1923 ) ,  p .  198. 
3 
questions between France and Great Britain which were not settled for 
three years. 
To make the European situation even more complex, the Franco-Russian 
entente developed between 1891 and 1893 and was to culminate in 1894 into a 
definite military alliance. By the terms of this highly secret agreement 
Russia was to aid France if Fronce was attacked by Germany or Germany and 
Italy. The French for their part were to aid Russia if she was attacked 
by Germany or Germany and Austria. This alliance, even though its precise 
terms were unknown to the other Powers ,  had the effect of putting Germany 
even further adrift in her international relations since she now faced 
the possibility of a two front war. 3 
England , for her part in the international relations of the 1890 ' s ,  
was remaining aloof, choosing to ally with no one Power while playing for 
assistance from nearly a l l  of them. Germany , because of this attitude, 
and because of English opposition to German colonialism in Africa and 
other places, such as Samoa , adopted a brusque attitude toward England. 
This semi-hostile attitude is  amply displayed in the fol lowing excerpt 
from a popular German newspaper: 
Too long (has) Germany tolerated this opposition (to 
German colonialis� ) .  Today our patience is exhausted. 
England went too far. The English government can no 
longer doubt that Germany has the strength and the will 
to prevent further obstruction of her colonial develop­
ment. There is no question here of enmity, or of hatred 
towards England. It is a question only of protecting 
German interests. The rulers of England should recognize 
clearly that they can accomplish more by altering their 
colonial policy than by trying to frighten us by the 
susposed isolation of Germany. 4 
3David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (New York: Alfred A .  Knopf, 
1962)' p.  491. 
4ner Kolnesche Zeitung, November 2 0 ,  1894, as  quoted in Raymond 
Sontag, Germany and England, 1848-1894. (New York: Russell and Russell 
Inc. , 1964 ) ,  pp. 303-304. 
4 
When Lord Rosebery complained of this attitude to Count Hatzfeldt, 
�he German ambassador at London, Hatzfeldt reminded him that for years 
Germany had sought an Anglo-German all iance. Lord Ro sebery then professed 
the standard reply that the British public would never permit any more 
than an informal understanding with any foreign power. 5 
This incident enun.ciated the whole attitude of England in the years 
of 1890-1896. She was not prepared to bind herself to a permanent 
alliance when British interests were not directly concerned and to 
cooperate only temporarily and informally where British interests were 
directly concerned relying on her large navy to off set the lack o f  any 
permanent alliance. 
The Germans, however , were not unduly worried by the lack of British 
cooperation. They knew that although they could make no alliance with 
England , there was even less chance that an alliance would be made 
between the English and the French or the English and the Russians. 
Germany well realized that the tremendous Empire of England kept her 
from aligning with any country where a conflict of colonial interest was 
liable to occur. 
In England itse l f ,  important social changes were occurring. The 
English population, as it had for the previous fifty year s ,  was becoming 
more and more urban. The workingmen o f  England were turning more and 
more to organizations other than the State for their betterment. 
Trades and labor unions were becoming increa singly popular. The rrbloom 
on the grapes of Liberalism was fading" before it could fully mature. 6 
5Raymond Sontag, Germany and England, 1848- 1894 (New York: Russell 
and Russell Inc. , 1964) p. 304. 
6oavid Thomson, England in The Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914 (Baltimore : 
Penguin Book s ,  1950 ) ,  p .  191. 
The Liberal party had appealed to the country as the party concerned 
with the masses. Now, the masses were turning elsewhere. 
In England too there was an increasing feeling of patriotism that 
5 
emerged in an ambitious colonial policy. This intense spirit, the flames 
of which were fanned by writers such as Rudyard Kipling and papers such 
as the Evening News , was supported throughout the whole o f  the Eng lish 
social strata. Perhaps this feel ing was generated because, as one 
authority has written, the new , lower middleclass city-dwellers, bored 
by their hum-drum , everyday existence in the workaday world , wanted to 
hear of exciting events , performed by their countryn1en in far off,  exotic 
places for the benefit of the British Err.pire. 7 
Political leaders , mostly of the Conservative party , as well as the 
man in the street, supported the expansionist ideas of imperialists. 
Even some Liberals,  who had the courage to oppose the ideas of 
Mr. Gladstone , supported a far reaching colonial policy. Lord Rosebery, 
the leading Liberal Imperialist, stated his feel ings expressively. 
The Empire that is sacred to me is sacred for this reason, 
that I bel ieve it to be the noblest examp le yet known to 
mankind of free, adaptable just goverrunent • • •  When a 
connnunity is in distress or under oppression, it aiways looks 
f irst to Great Britain; while in cases which are quite 
unsuspected ,  I think , by Great Britain at large , and which • • •  
are only known to Ministers , they constantly wish in some form 
or other to be united to our country and to enjoy our 
goverrunent. 8 
In domestic pol itics in England then, the Conservatives stood firm 
while the Liberal party was divided. The Liberals were divided not only 
on imperial ism (opposed by Gladstone , W. V. Harcourt , John Morley and 
others) ,  but were also divided on the issue of Irish Home Rul e ,  which had 
7David Thomson, England in The Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914 (Baltimore : 
Penguin Books, 1950), p.  192. 
8will iam A. Langer , The Diplomacy of Imper ialism (New York: Al fred A. 
Knopf, 1935) , p .  93. 
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been defeated in Mr. Gladstone ' s  last Ministry. The Liberals had only a 
precarious majority of forty in the commons, while only about f ive per cent 
of the Lords was composed of Liberals. 
From this brief sketch of English political and social life during 
the 1890's we can see that this England was not the sturdy, united England 
of thirty or forty yearR hefore. Her political leaders in a major party 
were divided , her social composition rapidly changing, her press 
jingoistic , her population ambitious for excitement but afraid of danger. 
It was in the midst of this uncertainty and because of it as wel l ,  that 
Lord Rosebery became Premier of England on the 3rd of March, 1895. 
Lord Rosebery became Premier, it is generally conceded , because of 
the preference of Queen Victoria, and because the leading Liberal 
statesmen did not wish to see the disagreeable W. V. Harcourt , Liberal 
majority leader in the House of Conunons, become Prime Minister. 9 
The reaction to the new Premier was mixed. In commenting on Lord 
Rosebery's abilities, the Spectator gave the following not very reassuring 
views: 
He is as full of indecisions as Mr. Gladstone was full 
of decisions , and is always trying to throw up straws to 
show him which way the wind blows. Naturally enough in a 
democracy so little educated, the wind blows in a l l  sorts of 
little eddies, and poor Lord Rosebery, like a child's windmil l ,  
turns now to one point of the compass, now to another. 
Whoever may be fit to guide our raw democracy , Lord Rosebery 
is at least not the man. 10 
To Edward Dicey, however , writing in the Fortnightly Review, Lord 
Rosebery "both as Foreign Secretary and as Chairman of the London 
9Robert Rhodes James, Rosebery (London: Wiedenfelt and Nicholson, 
1963 ) ,  p. 300. 
lOr'Lord Rosebery's Weakness" The Spectator , LXXII, November 17 , 1894, 
p. 686. 
County Council • • •  displayed many qualities which commanded the 
confidence of the British publ ic. rdl 
The view of at least one Frenchman was expre ssed in the same 
magaz ine. He said: 
He possesses some of our favorite characteristics 
without any of the faults with which we reproach the 
English when we are out of temper with them. He doesn't 
preach, he never talks through his nose, he exhibits 
neither Puritan cant nor academic pendantry nor 
aristocratic haughtiness. 12 
The German view given in the same publication envisioned Rosebery 
as a nonentity, known only to the German people rcto have married a 
daughter of the house of Rothschild , to be a friend of Herbert 
Bismarck ' s ,  and to own a horse which has won a famous race. 1113 The 
author , a German historian, felt that Lord Rosebery's combination of 
"Radicalism and imperialism'r would result in failure if the Radicals 
remained in power in England and had a chance to carry their program 
to its logical end. 
The Times gave this opinion of Lord Rosebery and his prospective 
Premiership: 
Disregarding the example and influence of some of his 
political teachers and masters (e. g. Mr. Gladstone), he has 
taken from the beginning of his political life a keen interest 
in all that appertains to the expansion and consolidat ion of 
the Empire. He is accordingly disliked by < .. 11 the "Little 
England11 faction; but the English people are believers in 
the great England bequested them by their ancestors and built 
up by the strenuous effort of generations. 
Lord Rosebery has reverted to the faith of Pitt and 
Palmer ston. That he has done so is to our own belief 
7 
11Edward Dicey, "Lord Rosebery ," Fortnightly Review, XLVI (December , 
1894)' p .  746. 
12Augustine. Filon , '�oreign Views of Lord Rosebery-France , 'r 
Fortnightly Review, LXII (December, 1894 ) ,  p .  761. 
13Edward Dicey, rrLord Rosebery, r r  Fortnightly Review , XLVI 
(December, 1894) , p .  770. 
' 
one of the principle factors in the popular confidence he 
enjoys to a far greater extent than any other member of 
the party except Mr. Gladstone. 14 
8 
The two fol lowing quotations can be taken as good examples of the 
reaction toward Rosebery's ascendancy by members of the two parties. 
Joseph Chamberlain, a leader of Conservative party, felt that 11Mr. 
Gladstone was one of those of whom it was sometimes s�id that his 
earnestness ran away with his judgement, but Lord Rosebery a llows his 
judgement to be run away with by the earnestness of other people.rrlS 
L. Atherly-Jones, however, a Liberal member o f  parliament , expressed 
the view in a letter to the London Times that Lord Rosebery would be a 
strong leader, and that nin r.espect of our international relations 
Lord Rosebery enjoys in a single degree the confidence of his fellow 
citizens and the respect of foreign statesmenrr alike. 1 6  These of 
course were strictly party views and must be accepted as such , but they 
probably mirrored the feelings of the majority of people aligned behind 
their respective parties. 
Lord Rosebery himsel f  was somewhat reluctant to accept the leadership 
of the nation. Realizing full well that leading a divided party with a· 
sma l l  majority would be a difficult task, he appreciated what lay ahead 
of him as Prime Minister. Some of his own party's leader s ,  particularly 
W. V. Harcourt , who felt that a s  leader of the majority in the House of 
Commons he should have rightfully been Premier ,  tried to interfere with 
his perogatives as First Minister. Rosebery enunciated his apprehensions 
in a letter to Sir Henry Ponsonby , secretary to Queen Victoria: 
14The Times (London) , March 5 ,  1894, p .  9.  
15E. T.  Raymond , The Life of Lord Rosebery (New York : George N. Doran 
Co. , 1923 ) ,  p .  138. 
16The Times (London) , March 6 ,  1894 , p . 7 .  
My Dear Ponsonby, 
Things are not going very well. One or two of my 
colleagues in the Commons are endeavoring to impose 
conditions--upon me--one of which is that the new Foreign 
Minister shall be in the Commons. 
I have refused to submit to any conditions not 
ordinarily imposed on a Prime Minister. I don't want to 
be Prime Minister at all , but if I am to be , I must be 
a real one. I h�vc told them that if this condition is 
pressed I will throw up my commission at once. That is 
how matters stand. Of course , all this is for the Queen, 
but I prefer to tell her informally through you. 17 
I am respectfully yours , 
Rosebery 
9 
and again in a letter to the Queen herself,  Rosebery repeated his reluctance 
to assume office. 
• • • he felt it his duty to inform :Your Maj esty • • •  
of at least some of the objections he sees to the task 
of reconstituting the Government. Nothing can diminish 
his sense of these objections but he cannot resist Your 
Maj esty ' s  appeal , and will endeavour to carry out Your 
Majesty's wishes. 18 
With these uncertain words Lord Rosebery became Prime Minister of 
Great Britain, an office' which he held for the ensuing fifteen months. 
This paper will examine the conduct of foreign affairs during those 
fifteen months. It is hoped that along with an examination of the 
events that transpired under Rosebery ' s  leadership , an evaluation can 
be made of his conduct of foreign affairs. 
17Lord Rosebery to Sir Henry Ponsonby , March 1 ,  1894. Letters of 
Queen Victoria , (Longmans , Green and Co. , 1931) third series , II , p .  33. 
18Lord Ros�bery to Queen Victoria , March 3 ,  1894. Letters of Queen 
Victoria , (Longmans , Green and Co. , 1931) third series, I I ,  p. 37.  
CHAPTER II 
LORD ROSEBERY 
Archibald Philip Primrose, the fifth Earl of l\osebery and Fi.rst 
Minister of Great Britain from March 3 ,  1894, until June 24, 1895, was 
born in London on May 7 ,  1848. He was the son of Arci1iba ld, Lord 
Dalmeny and of Catherine, the daughter of the fourth Earl of Stanhope. 
Lord Rosebery received his early education at 3righton and then 
at Eton, where he formed a fondness for the school that stayed with him 
for the remainder of his life. Shortly before his death in 1929, 
Rosebery instructed a servant to purchase a gramaphone and to play on 
it,  as Rosebery lay dying, the Eton boating son3. 
While at Eton, Rosebery became a favorite pupil of William Johnson, 
a teacher who lived in the same house as Rosebery. Although an 
exceptionally intell igent student the young aristocrat was not an 
exceedingly industrious one, and Johnson was to write another teacher 
that he would give him a irpiece of plate11 if he could get some work 
out of him. Rosebery, Johnson wrote , 11is one of those who like the 
palm without the dust.1119 Although later in his political career Lord 
Rosebery showed that he was capable of working hard and long, this 
phrase was often used as a weapon against him by his political opponents .  
Johnson also commented during Rosebery1 s  last year a t  Eton that Rosebery 
"will be an orator, and if not a poet, such a man a s  poets delight in. rr20 
19The Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery (London: Harper and Bros., 
193 1 ) , p. 15. 
20ibid. , p. 1 5. 
After graduation from Eton in 1865, Rosebery spent the next few 
months at the home of his s tepfather (his own father had died and his 
mother had remarried during his early childhood). It was here that he 
met Benjamin Disraeli, with whom he had several long talks. Although 
within three years of this meeting Lord Rosebery was to declare his 
11 
stand with the Liberal party , it is more likely than not that the young 
man ' s  ideas concerning foreign policy were in some manner colored by 
the influence of the great Conservative. Apparently he impressed 
Disraeli too , for Mr s.  Disraeli told young Rosebery that her husband 
had mentioned that he wished Rosebery could take a seat in the Commons 
for the Conservative party. 
In 1865 Rosebery entered Oxford, and it was while he was a 
university student that a friend of his mother's asked if he would 
be interested in running for Parliament. Because he felt he would 
have a chance to sit in the Commons for only a short time before he 
inherited his title, he declined .  Indeed little interest in politics 
was shown during this period of Ro sebery ' s  life, for when he became 
a peer in 1868 he declined the request of Lord Granvi lle,  Liberal 
leader in the Lor d s ,  that he make a seconding speech for Mr. Gladstone. 
However , in his letter declining the invitation, he stated that his 
•rprivate sympathy and • • •  reason have been wholly enlisted in the 
Liberal cause for some years.u21 
It is clear then that· at this early date in his life Lord Rosebery 
had assumed the ideas and political philosophies that were to determine 
his political life until early in the twentieth century. 
2 1The Marquess of Crewe , Lord Rosebery (London: Harper and Bros., 
1931 ) ,  p .  18. 
12 
Because of this early devotion to Liberalism, Lord Rosebery was soon 
attracted to Mr. Gladstone and his followers. Lord Rosebery had taken 
his seat in the House of Lords in 1868, and by 1871 he was a fol lower of 
Lord Granville. Mr. Gladstone had by this time already become a 
personal friend of Lord Rosebery. The letters Rosebery received from 
him irwere marked by ancient courtesy and paternal kindness, as they 
were throughout the remainder of Mr. Gladstone ' s  life. rr22 
In February of 1872 Lord Rosebery was asked by Mr. Gladstone to 
represent in the House of Lords the Board of Rating for the Liberal 
Government. Rosebery accepted and started on the long road of service 
to Mr. Gladstone and the Liberal party that reached through the years 
to 1900. Lord Rosebery had made a distinct impression on the old 
leader who once remarked "He is very decidedly a remarkable man, not a 
mere clever man: • • • From the first time I ever saw him I liked him 
and thought highly of him. cr23 
In the late 187 0 ' s  when Mr. Gladstone ended his self imposed 
retirement and spoke out against the Disraeli Government ' s  action during 
the Bulgarian atrocities and the Congress of Berlin , Lord Rosebery was in 
full agreement. In 1878 and early 1879 he p l ayed a prominent part in 
convincing Mr. Gladstone to stand as the Liberal candidate for Midlothian 
County. 24 After the campaign which drew thousands upon thousands to hear 
Mr. Gladstone , and which gave him a victory, Lord Rosebery was offered 
no Cabinet post. He then chose to take no post at al l ,  a decision which 
has been attributed to anger at his exclusion from the Cabinet as wel l  as 
to the circulation of rumors that his part in the campaign was motivated 
22Robert Rho9es James , Rosebery (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 
1963 ) ,  p. 63. 
23 Ibid . , p. 107 . 
24Ibid. , p .  92.  
primarily by a desire for public office. This somewhat contradictory 
reaction reveal s ,  perhaps ,  an element of aristocratic pride in his 
character. In any case he was at the time recovering from an attack 
of scarlet fever, and felt that he could not hold an office had it 
been given him. 25 
13  
By 1881, he had recovered from his illness and was given a position 
in the Government as Under Secretary for the Home Office. Evidently 
bored with his somewhat trivial dutie s ,  Rosebery resigned after two 
years service; he apparently was more interested in policy than 
routine. He returned to office, however , in a more congenial position 
as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Gladstone Government 
of 1885--despite his d ifference of opinion with the old leader on how 
foreign affairs were to be conducted. This ministry fell in the same 
year , but when Gladstone returned to power in 1892 , Rosebery was once 
again in the Foreign Office. There he "displayed a prickly independence 
from his Prime Minister which. pained the latter, but Rosebery's spirit 
was serviceable to England in the only foreign crisis of importance, a 
dispute with France (previously described) in 1893 about the frontiers· 
of Siam • rr26 It was when this ministry fell that Rosebery became 
Premier. 
In order to understand why Rosebery acted as he did when he became 
Prime Minister , it is necessary to examine his attitudes concerning 
imperialism and the maintenance of foreign affairs when he assumed a 
position of leadership. 
25Robert Rhodes James ,  Rosebery (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 
1963)' p. 96. 
2 6J. L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foote, Gladstone and Liberalism 
(London: English Universities Press , 1952 ) ,  p. 196. 
14 
Throughout his life, first as  a private citizen, then as a member 
of the Hou se of Lords , and finally as a member of the Cabinet and Prime 
Minister, Lord Rosebery was an avowed imperialist. As early as 1874, 
for example, he has spoken of the glories of colonization in an address 
to the Social Science Congre ss in Glasgow: 
Our race has colonised and colonises , has influenced and 
influence s ,  and in future ages seems likely to further 
colonise and influence, a great part of the globe. So great 
has been our field of influence, that we can only view it 
with awe. It has been , and i s ,  a great destiny for this 
country to sway so mightily the destinies o f  the universe • • •  
We have no right , perhap s ,  to hope that we may be an 
exception to the rule by which nations have their period 
of growth, and of grandeur, and of decay. It may be that 
all we most esteem may fade away like the glories of 
Babylon. But if we have done our duty we • • • even though 
our history should pass away, and our country become 
' an island salt and bare 
the haunt of seals and arcs and seamews clang, '  
she may be remembered , not ungratefully , as  the mother of 
great commonwealths and peaceful empires that shall perpetuate 
the best qualities of the race. 27 
In 1885 , before he became Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
Mr. Gladstone's third Government ,  Lord Rosebery again voiced his 
imperial views: 
The other day I was described, and I think truly 
described , as a Liberal Imperialist. So far a s  I understand 
these two words , that is a perfectly accurate description. 
If a Liberal Imperialist means that I am a Liberal 
passionately attached to the Empire and interested intensely 
in the best means of sustaining and promoting the interests 
of the Empire; if it means • • •  that I am a Liberal who 
believes that the external policy of Great Britain is one 
that should be founded not on independent attitudes of our 
own • • • if these be accurate descriptions of what a 
Liberal Imperialis t  i s ,  then I am a Liberal Imperialist. 28 
These comments with reference to Liberal Imperialism s�ould concern 
us here, because Rosebery ' s  concep t s  of the Empire and of  the foreign 
27The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery (London: A. L. Humphrie s ,  
1901 ) ,  pp.  68-69. 
28Ibid., p. 75. 
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policy it forced upon late nineteenth century England were unusual for a 
Liberal Minister. From 1865 until 1894, the Liberal party was so 
dominated by Gladstone that his ideas became the accepted program of 
the Liberal party as a whole. 
Gladstone ' s  views concerning foreign policy were best summed up by 
Gladstone himself. In 1869, in a letter to the Queen ' s  secretary, 
Gladstone , who was then Prime Minister, stated his outlook. He wrote 
that he felt it was a situation fraught with extreme danger for England to 
assume alone an advanced , and therefore i solated , position 
in regard to European controversies; that come what may it 
is better for her to ?romise too little than too much: 
that she should not encourage the weak by giving expecta­
tions of aid, to resist the strong , but should rather seek 
to deter the strong by firm but moderate language , from 
agression on the weak; that she should seek to develope 
and mature the action of a common or public or European 
opinion as the best standing bulwark against wrong • • • 29 
Gladstone again stated his views,  even more explicitly, on 
November 2 7 ,  1879, at West Calder, during his campaign for a seat in 
Parliament for Midlothian : 
Here is my first principle of foreign policy: good 
government at home. 
My second principle of foreign policy is thi s :  that 
it ought to be to preserve to the nations of the world the 
blessings of peace • • • 
My third principle is this: to strive to cultivate and 
maintain ,  aye, to the very uttermost,  what is called the 
concert of Europe; to keep the Powers of Europe in union 
together. 
My fourth princi?le i s :  that you avoid needless and 
entangleing engagements.  You may boast about them, you 
may brag about them, you may say you are procurri�g considera­
tion for the country. You may say that an Englishman can now 
hold his head up among nations. You may say that he i s  now 
not in the hands of a Liberal ministry , who thought of 
29J. L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foote, Gladstone and Liberalism (London: 
English Universities Press, 1952 ) ,  pp. 114, 115. 
nothing but pounds ,  shil lings ,  and pence. But what does a l l  
this come t o  gentlemen? It comes to thi s ,  that you are 
increasing your engagements without increasing your strength, 
you really reduce the Empire and do not increase it. You 
render it an inheritance less precious to hand on to future 
generations. 
My fifth principl e  is this: to acknowledge the equal 
rights of all nations • • • 
Let me give you a sixth and I have done. 
And that sixth is • • • forei gn policy should always be 
inspired with the love of freedom . JO 
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These, then, were the ideas that made up the bulk of the political 
thought of the Liberal party concerning foreign affairs. 
With the first , second , third, fifth and sixth principles expounded 
by Mr. Gladstone , Lord Rosebery was in tot&l agreement. With the fourth 
principle he could not and would not agree. Lord Rosebery re�ained a 
true disciple of imperialism and of the strong hand throughout his public 
career. In his heart and mind, Lord Rosebery always felt that the 
Empire and its protection was a cause rrfor which anyone might be content 
to live ; • . . a cause for which, if needs be,  anyone might be content 
to die.1�1 It was this attitude, this strongly rooted and deep seated 
feeling and belief, that guided his conduct of foreign affairs from 
March 3 ,  1894, until June 2 4 ,  1895. 
30charles Adams (ed.) Representative British Orations (London: 
G. P. Putnam , 1897 ) ,  pp. 320-323. 
31The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery (London: A.  L. Humphries,  1901), 
p .  47 . 
CHAPTER III 
AFRICA I 
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century the European 
Powers were engaged in an almost frantic rrrace for empire . "  Despite 
the efforts of anti-imperialists within the governments of the Powers ,  
colonialists kept the upper hand and imperialism continued almost unabated. 
Africa was a prime target for colonization and every major Power had at 
least a foothold there. In this situation conflict was bound to occur, 
and as we shall see later in this chapter, did. European diplomatists 
found themselves facing questions in Europe that were caused by colonial 
possessions thousands of miles away while foreign ministers were forced 
to spend a great deal of time and energy trying to unravel tangled 
problems caused by colonization. England , France , Gerniany , Italy and 
others were all involved to one extent or another in the whole colonial 
adventure. 
It was in this context that Lord Rosebery faced the first issue in 
foreign affairs to come before his Government. 
In June of 1892 the British East Africa Company which, since 1890 
had been in control of the vast territory of Uganda, had reviewed its 
interests.there and determined that it could no longer bear the expense 
of administering that territory. Lord Rosebery , at that time foreign 
secretary to Mr. Gladstone , was determined not to let Uganda slip from 
17 
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British control, for his imperialist orientation was strengthened by the 
likelihood that massacre and anarchy would follow. The foreign office 
was also reluctant to release an area that would give free access to 
other European Powers to the valley of the Nile, considered by England to 
be her sphere of influence. In order to prevent these contingencies the 
British government, at the insistence of Rosebery, persuaded the Company 
to postpone its withdrawal for a period of several months. In the 
meantime the explorer, Sir Gerald Portal, was sent to examine the 
situation and to make reconnnendations for the future of Uganda. 
The reports sent back by Portal indicated that Lord Rosebery was not 
alone in his belief that adverse consequences would follow a British 
withdrawal from Uganda. In a message to Rosebery that was received on 
December 6, 1893, Sir Gerald wrote: 
I fear that withdrawal of the present control, and the 
consequent loss of prestige might have consequences • • • 
which would shake the positions of Europeans throughout 
East and Central Africa and would result seriously in the 
neighboring colonies of Germany, Italy and the Congo State.32 
Bishop Alfred Tucker, residing in Mombasa, had already expressed 
similar views in a letter to Portal, dated March 30, 1893: 
Should her majesty's Government decline to undertake 
the expense and responsibility involved in the adminis­
tration of this country, it is my firm conviction that 
the consequjnces that must inevitably ensue would be most disastrous. 3 
The problem of Uganda arose and developed while Rosebery was foreign 
secretary. It was, however, due to his action as Prime Minister that the 
problem was finally solved. Events were developing slowly, due to the 
32Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LVII, cmd. 7307, 1894, 
"Reports Relating to Uganda by Sir Gerald Portal," p. 30. 
33Ibid., P• 39. 
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lack of communication and the tremendous distances involved, and as the 
London Times pointed out on January 8, 1894: 
The final consideration of the East African question, 
which had been postponed until his (Portal's) return, has 
only now entered upon the stage from which some decision 
can be expected.34 
It was not until three months past this date, on April 12, 1894, that 
the Government, now under Rosebery's direction, took any action. On that 
date the British East Africa Company was bought out and its administration 
was taken over by the British Government. On June 18, 1894, the British 
formally established a protectorate over Uganda and the situation was 
then resolved. The conditions in Uganda remained stable and a year 
later it was announced that •ta railway from the coast was to be begun 
as soon as possible and that the territory between Uganda and the sea 
was to be placed under a British protectorate.ir35 The Uganda question 
is an interesting study for it was not purely a colonial question, 
although it was indeed concerned with African colonial policy, but was 
also a question of foreign policy in that its settlement was motivated, 
in part at least, by a desire to block foreign aspirations in what had 
been traditionally considered a British sphere of influence. 
It was this same desire that involved Lord Rosebery in two more 
African problems, first with the French in Harrar and then with the 
French and Germans in Central Africa. 
In 1888 the British government had signed with France an agreement 
which dealt in part with the province of Harrar in Abyssinia. In 
Article IV of that agreement, the two governments pledged not to annex 
34The Times (London), January 8, 1894, p. 8. 
35The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery (London: A. L. Humphries, 1901), 
p. 39. 
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Harrar, a caravan route terminal, nor to make it a protectorate. At the 
same time, however, the governments did not renounce the right to oppose 
attempts of a third power to bring the province under its control. This 
agreement had been signed to lessen Franco-British tensions along the 
Red Sea. The next year, however, the Italians had signed a treaty with 
the ruler of Abyssinia in which he recognized Italian control over all 
of Abyssinia, including Harrar.36 
Although at the time the treaty was concluded the British complained, 
the Rosebery Government took advantage of the situation by reaching an 
agreement contrary to the spirit if not the letter of England's agreement 
with France. William Longer has described the circumstances concisely: 
On.May 5, 1894, a new treaty was signed. It was concerned 
chiefly with the delimitation of the frontier between British 
Somaliland and the areas claimed by the Italians. But there 
was a ''Note Officieuse annexee au Protocol" which, despite the 
Anglo-French Treaty of 1888 relating to Harrar; abandoned this 
province to Italy, while at the same time a "Declaration 
Secrete" allowed England to act there and regard it as part of 
her sphere until Italy was prepared to take over. Harrar formed 
the chief approach to Abyssinia. The new arrangement • • • 
would • • • block any attempt by France to establish control 
over this strategic point . 37 
Although the British government's actions concerning Uganda and Harrar 
partly blocked French designs in Africa, there was still one more avenue 
through which Britain's interests in the "dark continent" could be menaced. 
This avenue was the Congo Free State. ·controlled by Leopold II of 
Belgium, this neutral State had been founded by him in 1878. It began 
its existence as the International Association of the Congo when a number 
of conunittees were established to undertake the job of setting up the 
36william Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1935), p. 109. 
37Ibid., pp. 130, 131. 
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new country. Leopold had corranissioned the famed explorer H. M. Stanley 
to establish a series of stations along the Congo River. He was to also 
make treaties with the native chiefs and to construct a road between the 
upper Nile and the Congo estuary near the sea. The International 
Association was recognized in 1884 and 1885 by the Powers of Europe as 
the Congo Free State and Leopold was acknowledged as sovereign of the 
newly created State by the Belgian Chamber
' 
in 1885. This State, then, 
bordering on France's sphere in Africa, was another area through which 
England felt France could threaten her interests.in the Sudan. 
The problem England faced in the spring of 1894 had arisen from 
her relatively recent involvement in Egyptian and Sudanese affairs. In 
the late 1860's when the Suez Canal had been constructed in Egypt, part 
of the funds had come from the Egyptian government and part from 
European investors. Because of the expense of the Canal and of certain 
other internal improvements undertaken by the Egyptian government the 
Egyptian national debt had come to something near ninety million pounds 
and this crushing burden had finally forced the Egyptian Khedive to 
sell his 177,000 shares of stock in the Canal in 1875. Disraeli, then 
Prime Minister, saw a golden opportunity, and borrowing three million 
pounds from Rothschilds, he purchased the stocks for England;38 
The seeds of Britain's future interest in Egypt and consequently the 
Sudan were now sown. Because of the irranense amounts of money owed by 
Egypt to English investors, and because of Britain's part ownership of 
the Canal, England had a double interest if anything went amiss there. 
Her concern was soon aroused by the actions of Ismail Pasha, the Khedive 
of Egypt. In an effort to economize on the expenses of his government, 
38william !anger, European Alliances and Alignments (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), p. 274. 
he had reduced the pay of officers of the army by half. This shortage 
of pay, along with growing flames of nationalism fanned by Arabi, 
an army officer, led to a revolt of the army in 1881 and 1882. Anti-
foreign demonstrations occurred and the British felt intervention to 
be necessary. The French were asked by Gladstone to join but, to 
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their everlasting regret, did not. The British then decided to bombard 
the fortresses at Alexandria and considered following through with a 
landing force. This action was against the principles that had guided 
liberal foreign policy under Gladstone's control, but the foreign 
secretary, Lord Granville, who opposed Gladstone's idea of joint 
action, justified the bombardment as follows: 
A bombardment is a horrible thing, but it will clear 
the air and accelerate a solution of some sort or other. 
It is well for a country whose strength is maritime 
that naval demonstrations should not be thought to be 
absolutely without a sting. 
I am as decided as ever against a dual political 
intervention of the English and French.39 
On July 11, 1882, the bombardment was executed and the fortresses reduced. 
Desert tribes then began to threaten the Canal and the previously 
projected landing force became necessary. Gladstone, in the dilatory 
manner so characteristic of his attitude toward foreign policy delayed 
until September before taking action.40 Fortunately the French 
government had in the meantime fallen, leaving England with an almost 
complete freedom of action in Egypt. Gladstone was finally forced to 
take advantage of the situation and on September 13 the battle of 
39Lord Granville to Lord Ampthill, July 12, 1882. Harold Temperly 
and Lillian Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, 1792-1902 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), p. 
40william Langer, European Alliances and Alignments (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), p. 274. 
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Tel el Kebir was fought. The British were victorious and on September 15 
they entered Cairo. They were now in control of Egypt, but as one 
authority has commented rrthey could hardly have said themselves how they 
managed to get there.u4l And because they controlled Egypt, they also 
had claims to the Sudan-- rrthat unknown, undefined, largely wastelandrr 
into which Egyptian conquest had penetrated since the 1820's. Under 
the next Conservative administration (that of Lord Salisbury) this 
area was claimed by England as a sphere of influence, and the transition 
of Uganda from private administration to that of the British government 
suggested penetration of British influence northwards into the Sudan to 
meet their penetration southwards from Egypt. Lord Rosebery, as the 
Liberal foreign Minister in 1892 and as Premier in 1894, maintained 
British claims and the stage was thus set for a series of diplomatic 
conflicts between England and France that were not ended until 1899. 
The problems arose because though the Germans recognized the Sudan as a 
British sphere, the French did not, and thus had no qualms about intrusion 
into the area. 
It seemed apparent that the French desired to penetrate the Sudan in 
order to build a land bridge from their West African possessions to the 
Red Sea, possibly through Abyssinia to French Somaliland.* The British 
were stirred by the resulting threat to their north-south communications 
connecting Egypt and Uganda, essential to the development of British 
trade. 
4lrbid., p. 276 
*France had taken possession of this small area at the southern end 
of the Red Sea, and bordering also on the Gulf of Aden, in 1892, but the 
name French Somaliland was not adopted until 1896. 
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One author, however, had drawn a plausible case for a fear by the 
British that if the French gained control of the lower Sudan they would 
in some manner be able to regulate the water supply of Egypt. The French 
would then be able to bring flood or drought at will, and in reality 
42 would control the entire country. It was British insecurity over her 
tenuous control of the Sudan, then, which led her in 1894 to sign the 
Anglo-Congo Treaty of that year. Lord Kimberiy, the foreign secretary, 
and Lord Rosebery hoped that by this agreement not only would French 
designs on the Sudan be blocked, but that the Congo Free State would 
recognize the Sudan as a British sphere of influence. 
The Treaty itself consisted of three main articles. Article I, 
which provided for a rectification of the Congo State's northeastern 
and southeastern frontiers, caused no problems. Articles II and III, 
however, raised an European reaction. Article II leased to King 
Leopold for the remainder of his life a large area along the west bank 
of the Nile, a region that extended from the "northern point of Lake 
Albert Edward to Fashoda and westward as far as the thirteenth meridian 
east of Greenwich. " This would provide an area for Belgian penetration 
which would forestall French penetration to the Sudan. Article III 
provided that the Congo State 1rgrants under lease t o ·  Great Britain to 
be administered when occupied, a strip of territory 2 5  kilometers in 
breadth, extending from the most northerly point on L. Tanganyika to 
the most southerly point of Lake Albert Edward.rr43 This third article, 
as indicated in a letter by Lord Kimberly, was designed to connect 
42For an explanation of this idea, see Wm. I.anger ' s  Diplomacy of 
Imperialism, pp. 103- 108, 135. 
43Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol .  LVI I ,  cmd. 7307, 
session 1894, "Papers Relating to the Agreement between Great Britain 
and Leopold, King of the Belgians", p. 34. 
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''Lake Albert Edward, the Eastern shore of which is in the British sphere 
(in Central Africa) with the leased part. This secures to British trade 
uninterrupted coIIDllunication • • •  (between the two spheres). 1r44 The 
British in short were attempting to build their own bridge of 
corranunications from Uganda (just south of the Sudan) , southward between 
German East Africa and the Congo and by way of Lake Tanganyika, to 
* Rhodesia. 
As soon as the treaty was made public, immediate protests were made 
by both the French and German goverrunents. The Germans felt, and quite 
rightly, that their protectorate of German East Africa was being encircled 
and that their trade interests would thus suffer. Baron Von Marschall, 
the German foreign secretary, expressed these fears in a letter to 
Count Hatzfeldt, who was the German ambassador in London: 
We see injury to our interests especially in Article III 
of the Treaty which contemplates handing over a strip of country 
between Lake Tanganyika and Albert Edward. This would mean the 
rish of our protectorate being hemmed in on all sides by 
British territory. We must conclude from this unfriendly 
attitude adopted by the British that the neighborhood of the 
British on our borders would tend to draw trade away from 
our possessions in that zone.45 
Germany did not want a complete split with England on this issue, 
but was willing to, and to a certain extent did, cooperate with France. 
A further understanding of the German attitude toward the whole matter 
and toward cooperation with France can be gleaned from the following 
memorandwn by Baron Von Marschall: 
44Ibid. 
45Baron Von Marschall to Count Hatzfeld t ,  May 31, 1894, E.T.S. Dugdale 
(ed. ), German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, Vol. I (London: Harper and 
Bros., 1929), p. 312. 
*Cecil Rhodes British South Africa Company had been chartered in 
1889 for development of this area, and the capital, Salisbury, had been 
established in 1890; the name Rhodesia would not be adopted until 1895. 
The agreement of May 12 was a matter of principle 
and impinged on the basic underlying International 
Law in Central Africa. Thus far the interests of Germany, 
France and even of other European States coincided. 
(This) • • • made it necessary to consider whether or 
not it would be advisable for France and Germany to 
take as their basis for negotiation with England the 
maintenance of the status quo • • • if only France 
and Germany definitely agreed in the direction 
mentioned above and acted accordingly, their influence 
would not go for nothing in London. 46 
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In order to avoid an open breach with London, the Germans put most 
of the pressure on King Leopold of Belgium and pressed for an inunediate 
withdrawal of the Treaty. Germany's attitude toward Belgium is 
displayed in the following telegram from the German foreign office to 
the German ambassador in London: 
Withdrawal of the Treaty of May 12, and that without 
delay, is the only way to avoid complicating the European 
situation. England will learn she cannot treat us as she 
chooses and it will give her reason to prefer our friend­
ship to our ill will. We continue to press King Leopold 
to withdraw from the Treaty. If this fails because he is 
hoping England will support him, we must refuse to be 
responsible if the E�tian Question (between England 
and France) is raised and if a conference includes it in 
its program. 47 
Notable, too, in this conununication is the mention of the Egyptian 
question. This was in reference to Britain ' s  contention (recognized by 
Germany but not by France) that the Sudan, as Egyptian territory, was 
an English sphere of influence. Now Germany was threatening to 
withdraw her support of English influence in the Nile Valley. If t his 
were done, it would bring matters to a crisis. The question of 'England's 
rights in the Sudan, in short, could be approached by an European 
challenge to her status in Egypt proper. This was a consideration that 
46Ibid. , Memorandum by Baron Von Marschall, June 1 3 ,  1894, p. 316. 
47Ibid., Baron Von Marschall to Count· Hatzfeldt, June 15, 1894, 
p. 316. 
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weighed heavily upon the British, but not as  quickly as  the Germans had 
hoped. That the British had long been aware that just such a development 
might arise i s  indicated in the following minute by Lord Kimberly, the 
English foreign minister, written two months before the Anglo-Congo 
question: 
• • • This whole proceeding (a Franco-German agreement 
of March, 1894, concerning Comeroon) shows how little 
reliance can be placed in the assurance of the German 
Goverrunent that they desire to cooperate with us in 
Africa • • • It will be neces sary for us now to be 
strictly on the guard against this possible combination 
. h . 1 · Af · 48 wit our riva s in • • • rica • • • 
The first indication that the threat was not immediately having its 
desired effect was Rosebery ' s  warning that England could return to the 
policy of the "free land." This message was passed to Germany through a 
dispatch from the Austrian ambassador in England to the Austrian foreign 
office. In the message Rosebery mentioned that he was "very uneasy 
about the political situation in Europe" and that the "attitude of 
Germany causes him to ask himself whether England would not do better 
to alter her policy (in Africa) and to recover complete freedom of 
action. 'r Rosebery then enunciated the thought that possibly i s  the 
first indication of England ' s  drift from friendship with the Triple 
..... alliance which was to culminate in the Anglo-French entente of 1904. "
In a hey sentence he remarked that "Germany i s  a party to the Triple 
alliance and if she follows in Africa a policy hostile to England and 
48Minute by Lord Kimberly, March 3 1 ,  1894. Document 190. Harold 
Temper ly and Lillian Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy 
1792-1902 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1938 ) ,  p .  488. 
*England , although not wil ling to bind herself to any permanent 
alliance, had for years cooperated in a friendly manner with the 
Triple Alliance. Her part in the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 and 
in general diplomatic conduct toward the Central Powers had drawn her 
close to Germany. Most of this cooperation was initiated by the 
Conservatives but was carried on to a degree under Liberal Ministries. 
This cooperation finally ceased in the summer of 1894. 
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makes common cause with France, it will become impossible for the 
Cabinet of St. James to maintain her entente with the Triple alliance 
in European questions. tr49 
In the meantime King Leopold, the object of most of the German 
protest , was ready to give in when the Germans pointed out that 
Article III of the Anglo-Congo agreement was inconsistent with the 
Congo-German treaty of November 8 ,  1884. 50 By this time Lord Rosebery 
was beginning to change his mind. The Cabinet had not been informed 
of the treaty during its negotiation, and when they learned it had been 
signed, some members protested strongly. When Leopold asked 
permission to withdraw from Article III, the pressure of the Cabinet, 
and especially W. V. Harcourt, helped lead to Rosebery's consent. The 
Cabinet alone, however, did not cause Roseber y ' s  reconsideration. 
There is some indication that he began to fear the wrath of Germany. 
On the 16th of June he told Deyrn, the Austrian ambassador, that 
after reconsideration he "had come to the conclusion that • a 
strip of territory 25 kilometers in extent, in Africa, part of it 
in desert was not important enough to England to warrant a complete 
change in her foreign policy • • rr51 What prompted this comp lete 
change in attitude on Rosebery's part in the span of two days will 
probably never be known. It is probable, however, that on having 
second thoughts he realized how heavily things weighed against him--
the fear of German cooperation with France in relation to Egypt, the 
49Ibid., Count Deyrn to Count Kalnoky, June 13 and 14, 1894. 
5oThe Foreign Eolicy of Lord Rosebery (London: A. L. Humphries, 
1901), p. 35. 
51Harold Temperly and Lillian Penson, Foundations of British 
Foreign Policy 1792- 1902 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1938), Introductory note. p. 490. 
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opposition of W. V. Harcourt and other Cabinet members, a healthy 
respect for the magnificent German army--all these must have centered 
in Rosebery's mind and forced upon him the realization that to remain 
immoveable would be madness. On June 22 the objectionable Article III 
was bilaterally abrogated by England and Belgium , and thus Rosebery's 
scheme to unite England's two spheres of influence in Africa was spoiled. 
The protests of the French were paid little heed; and although 
the Cabinet criticized the foreign office for the problems it caused 
with France as well as with Germany, Rosebery shrugged off the protests 
with the remark that "the Anglo-Congo agreement is causing dispropor-
tinate excitement in France because France had endeavoured to do the 
same thing and failed • • •  n52 Since their protests were ignored by 
the British goverrunent it was once again King Leopold who was forced 
to yield. On August 14 he signed an agreement with the Frenc� by 
which in return for a rectification of the border between the Congo and 
French territory, King Leopold agreed to : 
renounce all occupation and to exercise in the future no 
political influence west or north of a line thus determined : 
longitude 30° east of Greenwich starting with its 
intersection of the watershed of the Congo and Nile 
basins, up to a point where it meets the parallel 
5'30° and then along that parallel to the Nile.53 
Rosebery did not oppose this action because he felt that Britain 
could not compel Leopold to occupy the areas leased to him. He realized 
full well too that there was enough truth in the French accusation that 
whoever the lands of the Sudan belonged to, they did not belong to the 
British, that this could result in an embarrassing international situation 
52Lord Rosebery to Queen Victoria, June 14, 1894. Letters of Queen 
Victoria, third series, II. p. 404. 
53william I.anger, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York : Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1935), p. 138. 
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if he pressed Leopold too hard. The British government then apparently 
felt that one of the main objectives of the negotiations--to obtain the 
recognition o f  the British sphere of influence by the Free State--was in 
no way, shape , nor form altered by the action of France. However , in 
another very important objective Lord Rosebery had miserably failed--
the French still had open access to the Sudan, a problem which was to 
lead to the Fashoda incident in 1898. After this ('wildest piece of 
diplomatic jugglery on record , rr the situation in Africa in 1894 remained 
at the status quo. According to one scholar , however ,  the British 
sti l l :  
entertained hopes that the comprehensive negotiations on 
all African matter s ,  begun in the summer o f  1894, might yet 
issue in a French renunciation of any designs on the Upper 
Nile or even a French reconciliation to the British 
occupation of Egypt itself. 54 
These negotiations , as we shall see in a later chapter , bore no fruit 
and within a year Britain was to be deep in diplomatic conflict with France. 
The "Africa Question'r between France and Britain was finally settled only 
by a show of force in 1898 during the great crisis at Fashoda. The next 
year an agreement was signed recognizing this fact , but intermittent 
trouble between Britain and Germany continued for another fifteen: years. 
54T. B .  Miller, "The Egyptian Que stion and British Foreign Policy 
1892-1894 , "  Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXXII (March, 1960) , p .  12. 
CHAPTER IV 
ASIAN AFFAIRS 
In another quarter of the world the political situation was rapidly 
changing. The area was the Far East and the cause of the change was 
Japan. 
In the short space of some thirty years Japan had risen from a 
fifteenth century feudal monarchy to a modern industrialized state. 
With the arrival of Japan as a great power new problems came into focus 
for the powers of Europe. Formerly the greatest concern Europe had 
shown in the Far East was in how best to carve the decaying Chinese 
Empire into more effective spheres of influence. Now Japan threatened 
the interests of the European powers by her aspiration to acquire a 
sphere of her own. This desire, coupled with the fact that Japan' s  
geographical proximity to China gave this rap idly rising power a 
decided advantage over other European power s ,  awoke European diplomatists 
to an altering balance of power in the East. The British government 
became cognizant of this change as early as July, 1894. It has been 
pointed out that: 
Lord Rosebery was among the earliest of European 
ministers to become alive to the situation in the Far East • 
It was Lord Rosebery who led the way for the other 
powers • • •  by the treaty of July 1 6 ,  1894. 55 
. . 
55The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery (London: A. L. Humphries, 
1901 ) '  p .  52. 
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By the terms of this treaty the extraterritorial jurisdiction 
of British Consular Courts in Japan was to be abolished within a year, 
and Japan was allowed to have customs tariffs, a s  she formerly could 
not. In return restrictions were removed from British trade conducted 
in the Japanese Empire. 56 As Sir Edward Grey later remarked in his 
autobiography : 
We had made up our minds that the time had come when 
dealings with Japan must be put on the same equal terms 
.as exist between nations of European; only so would 
cordial political and successful conunercial relations be 
preserved.57 
Japan however was not content with mere equality in these areas. 
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She was not diverted from emulating her European models in employing her 
industrial and military resources to exert influence over China in the 
Sino-Japanese War. 
Early in 1894 the Korean government, threatened by rebellion, had 
asked the Chinese government for help. China sent troops and Japan 
followed suit as both nations were allowed to do under the terms of the 
Tientsian Convention signed in 1885. However, when the Chinese 
government was ready to move its forces, the Japanese came forward with 
a plan to arrange reforms in Korea. The Chinese government refused to 
participate and the Japanese took over the Korean administration on 
August 1. They declared war on China the same day. 
The British watched these events with interest and not without some 
concern, as is indicated in the correspondence between the Prime Minister 
and Queen Victoria just prior to Japan ' s  declaration of war. In a 
telegram to the Prime Minister on July 30, 1894, the Queen expressed her 
56Ibid., p. 53. 
5 7sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years (New York: Frederick A. 
Stocker Co., 1925 ) ,  p. 22. 
concern at the way events were moving when she asked "'would not a 
joint demonstration by ourselves and Russia be the best thing? 
Something must be done speedily to stop what will be a very d isastrous 
war. rr58 
Lord Rosebery , however , was reluctant to cooperate with Russia in 
an intervention. In his reply to Victoria he indicated his fear of 
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working only with Russia and mentioned other complications in the affair: 
I am rather afraid of joint action in this affair, and 
no other power seems inclined to Join. Moreover in any case 
we should be too late. Japan is determined to force on a war 
and has done so. 59 
This opinion was shared by others in the Cabinet and although the policy 
received some criticism, it was generally supported throughout England. 
An author friendly to the government commented in the Westminister Gazette 
more than a year later on Rosebery' s  decision. In that writer ' s  eye s :  
nothing short o f  going to war with Japan ourselves 
could have prevented her going to war with China , and it 
would have been a strange policy indeed • • • to divert 
those evils (of war) from Japan to ourselves with the 
certain prospect of dragging in other European powers who 
from jealousy could not have held aloof. 60 
The war duly occurred; but after the first Japanese victories in the 
early part ·of the war, China informed the British government that she was 
seeking an "honorable peace. "  The British, therefore, sounded the other 
powers on an international intervention between the warring nations. 
As Lord Rosebery later said: 
The British government did not found any great hopes 
upon that, but we di.d think it our duty to sound the other 
courts of Europe and the United States (to see) if • • • 
58Queen Victoria to Lord Rosebery, July 30,  1894. Letters of Queen 
Victoria, third series ,  II , p.  417.  
59Ibid. , Lord Rosebery to Queen Victoria, p.  418. 
60The Westminister Gazette ( October 3 ,  189 5 ) , quoted in The Foreign 
Policy of Lord Rosebery (London: A. L. Humphries , 1901 ) ,  p. 53. 
there was any possibility of Japan and China coming to 
terms upon any such conditions • • •  61 
This of fer was spurned by enough of the powers to prevent its 
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implementation. Rosebery later described the rejection of the offer as 
fol lows : 
In the judgement of one or two of them, only one I 
think but we will say one or two of them to be within 
the confines of truth, it did not appear that the time had 
yet arrived when conditions could be put forward with any 
advantage to the consideration of the combatants. 62 
There was some question raised in England as to why the English 
government did not take it upon itself to intervene between the two 
nations, and take China ' s  considerations to Japan alone. Lord Rosebery, 
who was always an advocate of the concert system, felt that "the more 
great powers you have engaged in peace making, the better the peace. " 
He believed it was his duty to try and "secure a concert of powers in 
all great international concerns.1163 Beyond these reasons lay one 
more, perhaps more important than the rest. Lord Rosebery was, in his 
own mind , certain that : 
in the jealous condition of things produced by the way in 
China and Japan, it would have been madness for this country 
to have gone alone and attempted to act as bottle holder 
between China and Japan without incurring the suspicion of 
every power interested--and all powers are interested--in 
the East. 64 
According to The Times version of the intervention episode, two 
powers had declined , two gave no reply, and only one accepted the British 
suggestion. 65 The war, therefore, continued until April 1 5 ,  1895, when 
China surrendered and the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. By the terms 
of this arrangement China was, among other things, to cede to Japan: 
61The Times (London) , October 26,  1894, p. 10. (From a speech made by 
Lord Rosebery on October 24 , at Sheffield).  
62rbid. , p. 9.  
63rbid. , p.  10.  
64Ibid. 
65�Times (London) , October 25,  1894, p.  9.  
Port Arthur and the peninsula of Listung, Formosa and the 
Decodores Island s ,  to pay a large indemnity, to grant 
Japan the most- favored-nation clause in a new connnercial 
treaty, and to open additional ports to the connnerce of 
the world. 66 
It was when these terms were announced to the world that Russia , 
France , and Germany decided to intervene and force Japan to retract 
some of her conditions. At this point then, say some authorities, 
England did an about face and withdrew her friendship for China and 
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replaced it with that of Japan. 67 In England it seemed as though public 
opinion had switched in favor of Japan. It became evident that England 
wanted no part in the repudiation of the Treaty of Shemonoseki. Lord 
Kimberly expressed the government ' s  view in a letter to Queen Victoria 
when he wrote it would t'be contrary to sound pol icyn if England 
interferred , and the "wisest pol icy will be to watch event s ,  and it 
will be time enough to consider whether we should interfere, when 
we are convinced British interests are really in danger. rr68 Sir Edward 
Grey, then Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs ,  conunented on 
this attitude some thirty years later: 
I do not believe that Lord Kimberly had any ulterior 
motive in the decision he took not to interfere. We did not 
consider that British interests required us to join in this 
interference with Japan ' s  claims; the threat to her by European 
powers appeared harsh and uncalled for, and it was repugnant 
to join in it. 69 
England was then apparently ready to accept Japan as the victor , and 
if necessary to p lay her off against Russia in the Far East. The 
66E.  Malcolm Carrol , Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914 (New York: 
Prentice-Hall Incorporated, 1938) , p .  332. 
67 see William !anger , The Diplomacy of Imperialism and E. Malcolm 
Carrol ,  Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914. 
68Earl of Kimberly to Queen Victoria, April 23 , 1895. Letters of 
Queen Victoria, third series , II (Longmans, Green and Co. , 193 1 ) , p .  496. 
69sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years (New York: Frederick Stocker Co. , 
1925) , p .  23.  
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St. James Gazette expressed this view in its �.arch 18, 1895, issue. The 
magazine stated that if Japan menaced Russia in the East "it is no 
affair of ours.  For ourselves, if Japan acts as a counterpoise to the 
formidable Empire which is stretching one of its long arms around northern 
Asia, we are no losers . . ,iJ 0 . 
This attitude was to play an important role later in the cordial 
relations between England and Japan that culminated in the Anglo-
Japanese all iance of 1902. Whether this pol icy was formulated by 
accident or design is not and cannot be known. I t ,  at any rate, proved 
to be one of good fortune for the future foreign relations of England. 
Japan, however, was not the only Eastern problem to face Rosebery. 
He was confronted with the problem of p laying Russia off against Japan 
and yet remaining friendly enough toward her that some sort of entente 
would perhaps become possible. In order to partially accomplish this 
Rosebery reached an agreement with Russia concerning British and 
Russian spheres of influence in the Pamirs mountain area of Afghanistan. 
These conflicting spheres of influence had long been a bone of contention 
between the two nations but an agreement signed in 1887 had given a 
temporary respite to affairs leading to a dangerous situation. For more 
than half a century the British had advanced on the northwestern frontier 
of India toward Afghanistan. The Russians were pushing toward the same 
area, moving southeast from the Caspian Sea. Since Afghani stan was the 
immediate buffer to India�. , the British had a vested interest in its 
well being, considered it their sphere of influence, and were opposed 
to any efforts of the Russians to exert their influence over it. 
70The Saint James Gazette2_ in Will iam Langer ' s Diplomacy of Imperialism 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf ,  1935) , p. 175. 
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The crisis of 1885 had arisen when Russia claime d ,  as part of their 
Empire, Pendjeh ,  in the northwestern corner of Afghanistan. War was 
averted by careful diplomacy and in 1887 a definite frontier was 
established by treaty for that particular area of contention. This 
agreement was now refined and extended by the Rosebery government in 
the fall of 1894. As part of a general d ip lomatic move toward closer 
relations with Russia, the Pamirs Agreement . was negotiated in order to 
define the northeastern border of Afghanistan. The agreement , in 
general terms , provided for a l ine to be drawn running from Lake Victoria 
eastward to the Chinese frontier. * The border was to be marked out by 
a joint technical commission composed of British , Russian and Afghan 
members. The commission was also instructed to report on the situation 
at the Chinese frontier in order to help the British and Russian 
governments agree with China on the juncture of the Afghan-Chinese 
border. Britain and Russia also pledged in the agreement to rrabstain 
from exercis ing any pol itical influence or control:,·. the former 
(England) to the north , the latter (Russia) to the south, of the above 
l ine of demarcation • . . u71 The
0 British also agreed that the area of 
Afghanistan which lay in the British sphere of influence between Nindu 
Kush and Lake Victoria would not be annexed by Great Britain nor would 
it be fortified. The whole agreement was contingent upon the agreement 
of the Ameers of Afghanistan and Bakhara. Their agreement was obtained 
and the treaty was completed. The l ine drawn in 1895 still marks the 
present border of Afghanistan. 
71Great Britain, Parl iamentary Papers ,  Volume CIX, Treaty Series IX, 
cmd. 7643, "Agreement Between the Government s of Great Britain and Russia 
With Regard to Spheres of Influence of the Two Countries in the Region of 
the Ramirs", p .  8. 
*Lake Victoria is  in the extreme northeastern corner of Afghanistan, 
just west of the point where the borders of Kashmir , Afghanistan, and China 
. meet. It is the source of the AB-I-Panja River , at an altitude of 1 7 , 753 feet. 
In conmenting on this agreement after Rosebery ' s  fal l ,  the Review 
of Reviews noted that : 
No prime mini ster, not even Mr. Gladstone, came so near 
establishing that hearty good understanding with Russia 
which is the fundamental basis of any sound foreign policy 
for England. To replace suspicion by trust and to substitute 
friendly confidence for distrust was a great thing to have 
done even if it lasted only some few months. 72 
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Perhaps it is  true that no other Prime Minister had come so close to 
Russia. The P.amirs agreement had been designed as a stepping stone 
toward a rapprochement with Rus sia , and this larger goal was not 
achieved. England was to wait twelve years more before such an entent e ,  
under another Liberal ministry, became a reality. 
72 11The Record of the Rosebery Administration,rr Review of Reviews, 
August , 1895,  p .  196. 
CHAPTER V .  
THE BEGI�I�G OF ISOLATIO� 
It is d i fficult to say whether the desire for raoorochement with 
Russia was a product of the new isolation in which England found herself 
by mid summer of 1894 or whether it was pursued independently o f  that 
development. Rosebery had turned away from a pro- German attitude in 
connection with h i s  South African policy, and had refused to cooperate 
with the other European powers in the Far Eastern situation. The 
attempts to reach an acconunodation with Russia came in the fall. 
One authority attributes English isolation to the clumsiness o f  the 
Rosebery administration concerning the Anglo-Congo agreement. 7 3  This 
same author imp l i e s  that Anglo-German cooperation ceased after 1894 
because o f  Germany ' s  desire to end the established entente. This i s  
an inaccurate conclusion. Although Article III o f  the Anglo- Congo 
treaty had aroused German r e sentment and had caused Germany briefly 
to unite with France on the Egyptian que·s t ion , Germany did not d e s ire a 
lasting break with England. This attitude is exhibited in a letter from 
the German foreign office to Baron Von Heyking, the German Consul-General 
in Cairo. Written more than a month after the Anglo-Congo fiasco, the 
letter stated that by agreeing with the Khed ive ' s  anti-English att itude 
Von Heyking: 
7 3william Longe r ,  The Dipl oma cy o f  Imperialis� (�ew York: Alfred A. 
Knop f ,  1 93 5) , p. 145. 
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' 
• • • might incur the danger of joining the French 
representative in permanent opposition to the British 
one, and this would not suit our general pol icy 74 
40 
In another letter between the two diplomats Von Heyking was informed 
that for Germany to set herself in "open and permanent" antagonism 
toward England would 
be neither in consonance with the traditional close 
relationship between the two nations, nor with the 
feelings of our a s sociates in the Triple A l l iance. 7 5  
These references (and many more could be cited) to Anglo-German 
cooperation indicate that it was not Germany ' s  wish for the Anglo-German 
entente to cease. Another author has written that England ' s  isolation 
was a p lanned situat ion, and goes on to say that July 9 ,  1894 , was an 
11historic date" in British history. This conclusion is drawn because 
on that day Lord Rosebery spurned a German apology for past events ,  
offered by Count Deym, the Austrian ambassador. By doing so Rosebery 
marked the end of a more or l e s s  consistent Anglo-Austro-German 
cooperation begun in 17 9 2 .  I t  i s  concluded b y  the same author , then, 
that upon this date, July 9 ,  1894, England became intentionally 
i�olated. 7 6  
There had been, i n  late nineteenth century England , a good many 
influences pulling England and Germany apart. The German desire for 
colonies had for years rankled Englishmen, Liberal and Conservative 
alike. Even though the Liberal party under Rosebery ' s  guidance in 1894 
had many inner differences ·, it was solid on one point--opposition to a 
74Baron Von Rotenham to Baron Von Heykind , June 2 9 ,  1894, 
E .  T. s. Dugdale (ed. ) ,  German Diplomatic Documents 187 1 - 1 914, VII 
(London: Harper and Bros . , 1929) , p. 300. 
7 5rbid . , July 5 ,  1894 , pp. 300-301. 
7 6see A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Ma stery in Europe 1848- 1918 
( Oxford ,  The Clarendon Pre s s ,  1 9 54) , p .  352. 
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strong German friendship. The older Cobden-oriented Glad stonian 
Libera l s  were opposed to entangling alliances, ententes or agreements of 
any nature. The Liberal- Imperialists , of whom Lord Rosebery was the 
acknowledged leader, were opposed to an a l l iance or an understanding with 
Germany because the colonial interests. of the two nations were too often 
at o d d s .  It becomes evident , then, why there was no great effort on 
the part of England in 1894-95 to continue her previous pol icy o f  
diplomatic cooperation with Germany. 
Toward France the English were ambivalent. After the Anglo-Congo 
episode England showed a lukewarm desire to acquire an entente with 
France. In the sununer and fall of 1894 attempts were made to reach an 
un .erstanding concerning the Nile valley, but failed when Lord Rosebery 
turned down an agreement concerning the problem. The French , failing 
here, then launched expiditions toward the Sudan, according to one 
scholar, in order to force England to declare a de facto recognition of 
French rights in the valley of the Nile. 77 This action, however, a s  we 
sha l l  later see , had the exact opposite of i t s  desired effect and 
precipitated a serious dip lomatic crisis with England. 
England then pursued her attempt at rapprochement with Russia. The 
British negotiated the Ramirs Agreement with Russia which eased tensions 
in Afghanistan, and when the Armenian massacres broke out, attempted to 
�ork with both France and Russia to right the s ituation although efforts 
came to naught. Lorj Rosebery ' s  desire for Russian friendship was 
illustrated in a speech he gave at the Guildha l l  on November 11 , 1894. 
Referring to the Sino-Japanese war he said : 
77Ibid . , PP• .353, 354. 
In this delicate and difficult business we have acted 
hand in hand with Russia • • • In itself that cordial action 
with Russia is a fact of which we may rejoice. Ever since 
this Government has been in power our relations with Russia 
have been more cordial than I ever remember them to have 
been. We have , as  nearly as possible , I hope and believe, 
terminated the long standing difficulty with regard to the 
limitations of our spheres o f  influence in Central Asia 
(a reference to the Ramirs agreement) .  I ag�ee that if 
Russia and England can march with cordiality and without 
suspicion in Asiatic affair s ,  one great step toward the 
peace of the world will have been taken. 78 
These attempts at friendship with Russia brightened a few times 
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then lapsed into nothingnes s  because of Russia ' s disinterest. This is 
attributable to the fact that the developing Franco-Russian entente 
o f  the last four years had culminated in 1894 in a formal alliance, 
' although this fact remained for sometime a secret . �·( The British then 
remained aloof, going their way without alliance or entente until after 
the turn of the century. Planned disconnection from Germany and a 
lukewarm attitude toward France and Russia ended in unexpected and 
complete isolation. The responsibility for this state o f  affairs must 
lie with Lord Rosebery but it i s  doubtful that things would have been 
much different in another Minister ' s  hands--events were moving too 
quickly. 
78The Times · (London) , November 1 1 ,  1894 , p. 6. 
* As late as  1898 the German ambassador to Vienna , for exampl e ,  
•rfelt sure there was no formal alliance. n Rumloed t o  Salisbury , 
December 5 ,  1898 ;. British Documents on the Origin of the War as cited in 
Sidney Foy, The Origins of the World War (New York: Macmillan Co. , 
1948) , p .  121,  note 33 . 
CHAPTER VI 
AFRICA II 
Although Britain would later emerge from her isolation with the 
development of the Triple Entente, this was still a decade in the future. 
During Rosebery ' s  administration unresolved colonial conflicts between 
the English and French made a real understanding impossible. Thus in 
the fall of 1894 Lord Rosebery faced the very problem which he had 
earlier tried to prevent by signing the Anglo-Congo Treaty--French 
intrusion into the Sudan. 
France, refusing to recognize the Sudan as a British sphere of 
influence, held that if the Sudan belonged to anyone, it belonged to 
Turkey (because of her theoretical suzerainity over Egypt), and the 
British had no more�right to be there than the French. Since the British 
were there, however, the French felt that they must be there too. If 
the Sudan was, in fact, ownerless, the French reasoned, then it was 
anyone's game and the British ought not to complain. With this 
reasoning, then, the French launched an expedition of exploration toward 
the disputed area. This was done, according to one author, in order to 
force the British into recognition of French claims in the Sudan and, by 
so doing , to bring the British occupation of Egypt (which the French had 
always resented) before an European conference. 79 
79A. J. P. Taylor , The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 
(Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 354. 
It is hard to believe that the French government would engage in an 
undertaking a s  dangerous a s  this with such a tenuous and hypothetical 
policy. Lord Rosebery had warned of the danger involved in this p o l icy 
as early as November of 1894, when he said in a speech at the Guildhal l :  
The last difficulty to which I will refer is this. It 
is the danger of armed explorers. At this moment in the contin­
ent of Africa, we arc a l l  liable to a real danger from the 
aberrations of armed exploration • I am not charging any 
nation particularly • • • but what I would say is this - - that 
this exploration • • • constitutes a real danger to European 
peace • • •  Bo 
France was engaging upon further exploration of the very kind Rosebery 
had warned against. He then felt he must impress upon the French govern-
ment the fact that Britain would not yield and it was for this reason 
that Sir Edward Grey delivered h i s  famous Declaration in the House of 
Connnons on the evening of March 2 8 ,  1895. In that Declaration Grey 
stated that "the British and Egyptian spheres of influence cover the 
whole o f  the Nile waterway1r and that the "advance of a French expedition 
into an area over which our claims have been known for so long (5 years) 
would be not merely an inconsistent and unexpected act but it must be 
perfectly well known to the French government that it would be an 
unfriendly act*:�and would be s o  viewed by England. 8 1  
These were exceedingly strong words for the language of diplomacy 
among friendly nations. The significance which they carried , and were 
meant to carry when they were spoken, was gauged by Lord Rosebery in a 
speech at Epsom three years later when he said rrthe word ' unfriend ly ' 
80rhe Times (London ) ,  November 1 0 ,  1894, p .  6. 
8 1Great Britain, 4 Parl iamentary Debates XXXI I ,  189 5 ,  pp. 405-406. 
*This language was so strong that it was called by the Radical 
M. P. Henry Lalouchere a "quasi declaration of war11 against France. 
which socially has, perhaps, no particular meaning, or perhaps too 
conunon a meaning, is among diplomatists a word of exceptional weight 
and gravity. rr82 Grey ' s  use of this strong language has been questioned 
by many writers. Grey's own explanation, years later, was that the 
"language I had thought of using about west Africa (with reference to 
French activities there) was not suitable to the question of the Nile 
" r- - \;}/ 
valley. I ther��ansferred to the subject of the Nile the firmness I 
• 
· n�3 had been authorized to show about competing claims in West Africa • . . 
Lord Rosebery stated, however, in 1898, that he was 11'ersonally and 
ministerially responsible" for the Declaration. 84 The purpose then 
was to inform France, and to inform her in no uncertain terms, that 
the British considered all the Nile valley as a British sphere of influence 
that was not open to the intrusion of any foreign power. 
Queen Victoria, visiting in France at the time, telegraphed Lord 
Rosebery that: 
Your telegram is rather disquieting. While trusting 
that the government will preserve a strong attitude against 
French encroachments, I hope crisis may be averted • • •  
It would be very awkward if compl ications arose with a country 
in which I am now residing and receiving marked courtesy 
and attention. BS 
The French received the Grey Declaration with some surprise. Following 
the dispute over the Anglo-Congo Treaty in the spring of 1894, negotiations 
with France over African affairs had been carried on through the sununer 
and into the following winter. According to one authority the British had 
delimited an Egyptian sphere of influence extending as far south as 
82The Times (London) , October 13, 1898, p. 10. 
83sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years (Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), 
p. 19. 
84The Times (London), October 13, 1898, p. 10. 
85Queen Victoria to Lord Rosebery, March 29, 1895. Letters of Queen 
Victoria, third series, II (Longrnans, Green and Company , 1931), p. 493. 
Khartoum and a separate British sphere farther upriver extending 
northward from Uganda to Fashoda. Thus a large area along the Nile 
River would be open between these two point s .  The earl ier d ispute had 
actually involved the portion of the Sudan upriver from Fashoda lying 
between Abyssinia and the Congo and just north of British Uganda. The 
delimitation of the two spheres just indicated would seem to show that 
British negotiators were a ssuming that the specifically British ( i . e. 
non-Egyptian) sphere had derived from an extension o f  their claims northward 
from British Uganda. The significance lies in the gap between Fashoda 
and Khartoum. Rosebery, however, was not thinking in the same terms a s  
his negotiators. Already in June he had declared "that the Nile i s  
Egypt and Egypt is the Nile. rc8 6 His previous initiative in the Congo 
di spute clearly reveals an intention to build a north- south bridge 
connecting British claimed areas. Thus his response to the delimitation 
of spheres embodied in the unsigned draft agreement arranged by his 
negotiators was to repudiate terms which recognized that fatal gap along 
the upper Nile--hence Grey ' s  Declaration. The unsolved mystery lies in 
why he had permitted to proceed so far in recognizing a position with · 
which he was not in agreement. 
At this moment in history England had deliberately put herself adrift 
from her entente with Germany and was looking toward France and Russia 
for a d iplomatic understanding. Yet in this very s ituation Lord Rosebery 
adopted an attitude just short of warlike in order to protect British 
colonial interests from France. This illustrates that in foreign policy 
under Rosebery's leadership there could be no diplomatic cooperation or 
86william Longer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York : Alfred A. 
Knopf, 193 5 ) , p. 138. 
alliance with any power if, in the last analysis, British colonial 
� 
intere sts would have to be sacrificed. This was true earlier (in 1894) 
with Germany, and it proved to be true again in 1895 with France. 
Therein lies the cause for no entente or alliance being effected while 
Rosebery was in office. France and Russia were aware of Rosebery's 
attitude and thus their attempts toward friendship were no warmer than 
Britain's were. 
The French ambas sador stated that "he could not but regard the 
declaration made in the House of Conunons as a 'prise en possession • rr 
on the part of the British government. To this Lord Kimberly replied 
that he "could not see that the reiteration of a claim already made 
known to the French government could be regarded a s  a 'prise en possession. 1 1r87 
Fortunately the French government did not make an issue of the affair and 
it momentarily passed over. The British, under the succeeding govern-
ment of Lord Salisbury remained firm in their determination to hold the 
en�ire burden and �he question was not resolved until the Fashoda crisis 
in 1898. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION 
The administration of the Earl of Rosebery fell on June 2 2 ,  1895. 
rrsick of his colleagues I dis sent ion (particularly w. v. Harcourt ) )  he 
took advantage o f  an unimportant defeat in the Commons to resign. rr87 
The nunimportant defeaer was over the question of the censure of the 
war minister, Sir i:�nry Campbel I-Bannerman, for incompetency in h i s  
department. In 1891 the British army had switched from rifles using 
black powder to those using cordite. The contention of the Conservatives 
in 1894 was that the Liberal government , first under Gladstone and then 
Rosebery, had kept in supply only enough cordite cartridges for 1 1 0 , 000 
men, instead of enough for the 3 9 0 , 000 men actually in the British army. 88 
For this failure the opposition moved, on June 2 1 ,  to reduce Campbell-
Bannerman' s  salary by LlOO. The vote in the Commons was a s  follow s :  
For the reduction - 132 
against the reduction - 1 2 5  
The majority for - ---7 89 
Not an important defeat by normal standard s ,  this seemingly minor 
question signaled the exclusion of the Liberal party from politics for a 
decade. The London Times described the situation: 
48 
The goverrunent at first intended to carry on but her 
unanimous consent changed its mind and decided to resign 
when it was decided the war minister had been insulted 
and if this could not be wiped
9
out, he must res ign, and 
the goverrunent res ign a s  wel l .  O 
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On the 22nd of June Rosebery submitted his res ignation to the Queen, 
where it was accepted inunediately. 
In the conunents following Rosebery ' s  fall from power the reaction 
was mixe d ,  as it had been at h i s  accension. Some felt Rosebery had 
muddled h i s  way through his tenure of office. An article in the 
Fortnightly Review criticized Rosebery by conunenting that rrthe short-
comings which have shown themselves in h i s  short record as premier are 
due to a lack o f  experience and self-assertivene s s .  rr91 The Nation 
felt that Lord Rosebery had been rrthe Melbourne or Palmerston type of 
minister who did not think anything mattered very rauch and was not very 
sure of h i s  conviction. "92 A d i f ferent opinion, however , was expressed 
by the Review of Reviews : 
In view o f  Lord Rosebery ' s  effort in 1894 to open an A l l  
British Route from the Cape t o  Cairo , i t  would b e  difficult to 
conceive a bolder model of foreign p o l i cy. The new epoch in 
foreign p o l icy is his work and in that decisive idea he 
rendered a service to his country with which few achievements 
in office w i l l  compare. 93 
Whatever the opinion of the journa l i st s ,  Lord Rosebery had managed 
to lead the nation for a period o f  fifteen month s ,  anci in those fifteen 
' 
months he held firm control of foreign affairs. Lord Ximberly was the 
foreign minister, but as one author has written, he wa s :  
90The Times (London) June 2 4 ,  1 8 9 5 ,  p .  6.  
9 l c'Lord Rosebery and the Liberal Party, 11 Fortnightly Review, Vol .  LXIV. 
August 1 ,  1 8 9 5 ,  p .  23 6 .  
9 2The Nation, Vol. LXI I I ,  October 1 5 ,  1896. 
93 1'Disraeli o f  Liberalism, r r  Review of Reviews , Vol .  XIX, February, 189 9 ,  
p .  2 2 9 .  
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competent but of no great force of character (and )  was bound 
to be little m��e than an instrument in his (Rosebery ' s )  
hands. In fact the control of foreign affairs remained in 
the ?rime Minister ' s  hands. 94 
Rosebery controlled foreign affairs indeed, often times without the 
consent of the Cabinet. For this be received much criticism, from both 
his contemporaries and future historians alike. 
To evaluate this control of foreign affairs is not an easy task. 
Rosebery faced no crisis of great import such as Fashoda, but during his 
tenure of office England did face serious questions. Probably the most 
serious crisis of that period was when Sir Edward Grey, under Rosebery ' s  
instructions, issued his famous Declaration t o  France that penetration 
of the Nile valley would constitute an "unfriendly act'r toward Britain. 
Here it is quite possible that war could have ensued , as it nearly did 
for the same reason at Fashoda three years later. This only crisis of 
any importance under Rosebery was due of course to his firm conviction 
that the Sudan was a British sphere of influence. He was not the first 
or last minister, however, to hold such a conviction. 
In other affairs Rosebery ' s  decision not to intervene at the signing 
of the Treaty of Shimenonseki turned out to be a wise one, for by that 
intervention every European power except England incurred the enmity of 
Japan. 
Concerning other questions, Lord Rosebery did what he must have felt 
in his own mind to have been best. He was responsible to a large degree 
for England's isolation of 1894-1904. He broke the entente with Germany 
and failed, because of his only lukewarm attempts, to attain one with 
France and Russia. He acted as he did in these cases because he felt he 
94 ( c. T. Raymond, The Life of Lord Rosebery New York: 
Doran Co., 1923 ) ,  p. 142. 
George H. 
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was protecting the life-blood of his country--British Imperialism. His 
blundering in the Anglo-Congo Treaty is almost inexcusable, but there 
probably was no permanent or important , at the time, damage done. 
However , one authority has pointed out that after rrthe collapse of the 
Anglo-Congolese Treaty a hopeless muddle seemed to overtake the foreign 
off ice. rr 9 5 
Perhaps Lord Rosebery was an opportunist , taking action to meet only 
a present s ituation, with l ittLe regard to future consequences.  With his 
vision somewhat blurred by his burning imperialism this seems more l ikely 
than not, to have ·been the case. Perhaps too things would have been 
different had he possessed a larger maj ority (the most he ever had was 
forty) and a united Cabinet. With those assets in his favor , he might 
have been able to have wielded a more stable and lasting policy. 
The Review of Reviews sununed up Rosebery's situation: 
He was not the head of his government. He was the figure 
head of their govern.�ent. He was not a minister who had 
established an ascendary in politics before rising to the 
highest office, who had chosen his colleagues and given the 
organic impress to his own Cabinet in its formation. He was 
less a Premier supported by a Cabinet than a Premier in the 
custody of a Cabinet. There was open and arrogant sedition; 
there was desertion, opposition, lack of sympathy, hopeless 
incompatability of temper. 96 
Lord Rosebery ' s  Premiership has been accused of being sterile of 
accomplishment. Whether one accepts this view depends on how much 
importance is attached to the events that arose under his leadership. 
Had he been Prime Minister at a different time, in a different day, he 
might have had the fame of Palmerston or Disrael i .  But that i s  in the 
realm of speculation and we wil l never know, for history is as  it i s ,  
and we must judge those who contribute to its never ending stream accordingly. 
95Robert Rhodes Jame s ,  Rosebery (London·:· Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 
1 963 ) ,  p. 377.  
9 6rrnisraeli of Liberalism, er Review of Review s ,  Vol.XIX, February, 
1899'  p .  230. 
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Lord Rosebery himself was not sorry to leave the seat of power. As 
he wrote some years later: 
There are two supreme pleasures in life. One is idea l ,  
the other i s  real. The ideal is when a man receives the 
seals of office from his Sovereign. The real is when he hands 
them back. 97 
And thi s ,  perhaps ,  is the best corranentary of all on the Premiership 
of the Earl of Rosebery. 
97  
Robert Rhodes James , Rosebery (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 
1963 ) ,  p. 384. 
The i:nglo - Congo TrcD.ty 
1'.iay 12 , 1394 
"' -1 '"nec�t .' - �-t:. 
7E'.·� UndeY s ie;ned . the ?.:onouTable S i r  ?-.cr.:i.ncj_ s R ichard 
Pl unke tt , a K11 ight Grand Cross of the Mos t Distinguished 
Order of S t .  Michael o.:nd »S t .  Georg e ,  Her Br i tann i c Maj e s ty ' s 
Envoy �xtraord.inary and I�i::-i:!.. s t er Plenipotentiary t o  the King 
of the Belgians , on behal f  of the Br i t i sh G overnme nt , and 
B .  van Eervelde , Officer o f  the Order of Leopold , Grand Cross 
of the Order s of S t .  Gre[>�o:qr the Great , of Chr i s t  of Por tugal , 
and of the African R edempt i o n ,  &c . ,  Secre tary of State o f  the 
Interior of the Inde pendent State of the Cong o ,  on behalf of 
the Government of the Independent State of the Cong o ,  duly 
. . 
author ized by their re spec tive G overnment s ,  have agre e d  as 
follm·rn : -
rli s  Najesty the King of the Belc;ians , Sover if;n of the . 
Independent StEi:te of the C ongo , having recognized the Br i tish 
sphere o f  influence , as laid down i n  the .Ane;l o-Gerr:lan Agreement 
of the 1 s t  July , 189 0 ,  Great Britain under take s to give to His 
r·ia j e s ty a lease of te:-ri tc� ies iY-1 the v:"est2:1�n basin of' tLe Nil e , 
i.J_ntle:i.1 the c on.d i ti or..s speci fied in the following A2�ticles : -
ARTICLE I .  
( a . ) I t  i s  agreed that the sphere of influence bf . , 'C!'le 
Independent Congo State shall be l imi ted t o  tha north of the 
German sphere in East Africa by a fr on ti er foll owi.ng the JOth 
meriaian east of Greenwich up to i ts inter sec ti on by the 
wate�--:::hed bc t11.reen the Nile e.nd the Conc;o ,  and thence fol­
lowing t�"liS t-:ater shed i� a northerly aild north-westerly 
direction .  
( b . ) The frontier between the Independent Co:nc;o State 
and the :Sri tish sphe:ce to '!;he north of the Ze.:nbcsi shall 
follo•·r a l ine running dir<::ct from the extremity of Cape 
Akalunr;a on Lake Tane;anika, si tuated at the northernmost 
point of Cameron Bay at about 8° 1 5 '  so�th latitude , to 
tl1e rie;ht bank of the River Luapula,  where this river issues 
from La1{e Hoero. The line shall then be drawfl. directly to 
th� ent�ance of the river into the lake , beine; , however , de­
flected towards the south of the lake so as to give the Island 
of Kilwa to Great Britain . It shall then follow the 0 thalweg11 
of tn.e Luapula up to i ts i ssue from Le.ke Bangweolo .  Thence i t  
shs.11 run southwards alo!lg the meridian of longitude of the 
point where the river leaves the laJ:(e to the water shed between 
the Congo and Zambes i ,  which shall follow u:ntil i t  reaches the 
Portuguese frontier . 
ARTICLE I I .  
Great :Sri tain grants a lease to His l·�ajesty Kin3 Leol_)Old 
II , Soverisn of the Ind2:pendent Con50 State , of the territories 
hereinafter defin ed , to he oy hi:m occupied. and administered on 
the conditions and for the :?1eriod. of time 1"P.re8.ftcr la.id down . 
The territories shall be bou:nc by a l ine starting from a 
point si tuated on the west shore of Lal-ce Albert ,  immediately 
to the south of !f:ahae;i ,  to the nearest point of the frontier 
defined i:::.1. p.�.ra.:. · ; aph ·( a )  o :  the ·9rccedinc; _l:.r ticle . Thence 
i t  shall !'ollow th0 1-Ja tersl1(".U b::!tuE:;;::n the C on�o and the Nile 
up to the 2) t}1 mer idian ea:::; ,.; o:"' Greern._ric h ,  anc. that mer idi an 
up to i t s  i�1tersec t i on by the 1 0th parallel nor th , �·;hence i t  
s?1all :.� Gn alone that �)a1�ellel di::.�ec tly t o  a poi::.1 t t o  be deter­
r:iineCi. to the north of ?ashoci.a . 'i'rlcnce i t  s�1all follow the 
11 t:--ial1ie011 of the �rile s ou th�·m.rd to Le.ke Alber t ,  and the Hestern 
shore of La.J;:e Albe r t  to the :point above indicated south of Eahag i .  
T'.:l i s  lease shall rer.1ain i n  force c'iu:rir..c: the re i3n of � i s  
:•:a j e s ty Leopold II , Soveri�:n o f  the Indepe::.-:dent Conc;o State . 
Neverthc:le:::: :: , 2.t the cxpirati or.. of B:is Ea.J esty ' s reizn, i t  
shall ren.s.in fully i n  forcE; as far as co;iccr�w all the por ti on 
of the ter:ri tor ie :::; a oove ::.lentioncd si tuated to the i·rnst of thb 
J O th �e:cidian e�st of Greem·� i c h ,  as well a� a s t r i l,) of 25 lc�. lom .  
i n  brcz.d.th , t o  be delimitat �.:i 1)y .:.: o;::i:.on c on�ent , s tr e tchi!J.g 
wc s ter:1 s:1.orc of Lake Llbc r t ,  e.nd includin£:; the port of Tiiahagi .  
This extended lease sh::..11 be continued. so long as tr�e 
Cc� o ter:ri tories a. s an Ind.u�.:i1�i1d.cnt State or a.;:: a 3elt;i$.l1 
C ol ony re:!l.D.in under the sove1�ei�i1ty of ?.:is 11;a j e s t y '  s suc c c s-
sor s .  
':'�1.rou.::;'hout the �ontinu<::»�1ce o f  a lease there shall be a 
special flas in the leased territories • 
.t.��TICLE I I I .  
The Indepen�ent Congo S tate �rants under lease to Great 
Britain , to be a.dministere� when occupi ed , under the con� i t i ons 
and for the per i od here2fter dctcr�ined , a strip of te�r i tory 
25 l::il o!!� . in b:::.·eadt�1 ,  extc::.1d ins f:tom -the uost northerly pert 
on La\-e TG.n,sarlikn , >:·���J.ich i :s  in cl ude d in i t ,  to the most s o uth-
erl;</ point of Lalrn J:.lbert :;d;1w.rd . 
T�1is lease will i.1ave si�ilar dur ati on t.o tl'lat 1-.ihich a�plie s 
to the terr i tori e s t o  the i,·..re s t  of the JOth mer i dian east of 
Greenwich·. 
k'1TICLE IV. 
His Eajesty Kin0 Le opold II , Soverii:.g of tl1e Independent 
Conr;o State recogni�es that He nei ther hac nor s ce1.-::s to acquire 
any pol i tical rit;hts in the terr i t or i e s  ceded. t o  him under lease 
in the Nile Basi::i ot�er than th ose which are in confor::nity with 
the· pre s ent .. '\.e;ree�ent . 
SiTiilarly, Grea t Britain recc0n i z e s  that she ne i ther has , 
nor seexs to acq_uire , :::ny :pol i tical i� ic;hts in the strip of 
territory r;ran ted to her on lear;e be hlfeen Lal�e '?anr:;anika and 
Lake J\l bert Ed:ward otl1cr than thm::e which are in conformity· 
vii th the present AGree�ent . 
A3TICL'S V .  
The Ind.ependent Con00 State author i ze s the c o�1.struction 
thr ou�h i t s  terr i tor i e s 0Jr Gre.s:.t :Br i tain , or by any Company 
duly authorized by the Bri t i sh G over1".l!lent , o f  a line o f  tele­
graph connec tine the British tcrri tori es in So11th .i:i�frica i-.:i th 
the British sphere of influence on the Wile . The G overri.,ent 
nf the Conzo S tate shall hav� facilities for c onnec ting this 
line t·Ji th i t s  ovm telezr a9h i c  system. 
([.) �1.Y co· ' ' 0""�11"' . """er C"O"' -.·r T1t:»;"�· r,;'\C" -1 �:..le F "" 'C.0"'1 +- o C O''l '·�·:-urc ..... -T-'ne ... _ ' !.:yo .. �· ' :./ . '·' • • ' ·' . .' "-· · " '-'-- •·' > 1.J ._ . , .....> � "  � ....._ v ... _., v . t, v . .  
telccraph 1 L1e a r.y rir;hts of' police o:c acl.1ainistration with-
in the territory o:t the Cor:.[.;o State . 
:�-:-:�ICL:': VI . 
In the ter�itories under lease in this AGreenant the 
subjects of eG.ch o:l the Cor�tractine P&rties shall recipr--:-
ocally en.joy eq_U<.?l.l �ric;ht�: 2x.:.c1 i�muni tie s ,  and shall . not be 
sub j ected to any d ifferential treatr!!Cnt of nny �<ir:d . 
Ti1. ·wi tne s s  whe:�c of the Unde:rsic;�ed have signed the 
present Asrec!:lent and have affixed therto the seal of tl'leir 
arms . 
Done in duplicate o.t Brus sels , this 1 2 th day of I1ay , 189l1- . 
( L . S . )  �ANGIS RIC:IA3.D PLUi�-c:ETT. 
( L . S . ) ::srn-1 . van EETVI;LDE . 
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